Sumario: May 2, 2005: STATEMENT AT THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY H.E. MR. NICOLAS SCHMIT, MINISTER DELEGATE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IMMIGRATION, ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (New York)
I have the honour of speaking here today on behalf of the European Union. The acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Turkey and Croatia*, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro, align themselves with this declaration.
I want first of all to congratulate you on behalf of the European Union on your unanimous election to the Chairmanship of the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Allow me to say how happy we are to see you chair this important conference. The EU is convinced that you will be able to bring this conference to a successful conclusion. In the performance of this important and difficult task, the support, the cooperation, the confidence and the gratitude of the European Union are entirely yours.
The 2000 Review Conference was a success, and consensus was reached in spite of the fact that the Preparatory Committee, which met in 1999, did not reach an agreement on even the most basic questions, not even recommending the implementation of ancillary bodies to the 2000 Review Conference. The same situation came about during the 2004 Preparatory Committee, which was unable to formulate fundamental recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference.
As this was the case during the 2000 Review Conference, the European Union will do everything possible, in cooperation with all the partners, to ensure the success of the 2005 Review Conference.
Our conference coincides with the 60th anniversary of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.The European Union recalls in this regard the preamble of the NPT, which states, and I quote, "Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. In addition, the European Union hopes that this Conference will help strengthen the framework of collective security established by the NPT. It is our utmost responsibility to put everything into place to attain this objective and make our world safer. Let us rise to this noble challenge!
To guarantee and strengthen peace, security and stability at the international level, the NPT is an irreplaceable legally binding instrument. The EU emphasises that the Treaty remains both the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for pursuing nuclear disarmament under Article VI, as well as being crucial to the development of pacific applications for nuclear energy. We must not do anything that would risk damaging the integrity of the Treaty or that would compromise the essential balance it expresses. This is in our common interest and in the interest of peace, security and stability.
The EU wishes to contribute to the building of a consensus based on the established framework of the Treaty by supporting the decisions and the resolution adopted during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and by taking into account the current situation. In addition, the European Union considers that the recommendations made in the report of the Secretary General of the UN, and those in the report presented by the high-level panel on threats, challenges and change are useful and should be subjected to a detailed review, which should be taken into account in the framework of this conference.
The Heads of State and Government of the European Union adopted on December 2003 an EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This strategy is in line with the common position that the Council of the EU approved in November 2003 regarding the universalisation and the strengthening of the multilateral agreements in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We are convinced that the best means of guaranteeing peace and stability are to adopt a multilateral approach to international security, including disarmament and non-proliferation. This conviction is at the heart of the strategy I just mentioned.
Multilateralism is based on the principle of engagement and shared obligations, laid down in binding legal instruments, and on respect for obligations undertaken in the framework of multilateral agreements. It follows that all the states that are party to the NPT should honour their commitments and their obligations. The EU considers it to be of the utmost importance to bring about a policy that will create more respect for the Treaty. One such policy should be based on a system of effective guarantees that ensures that violations of the Treaty will be detected, thus discouraging the misuse of nuclear materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and which is a credible instrument regarding missing materials and undeclared nuclear activities. In this context, the EU calls on the states that have not yet concluded a Full Scope Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to do so without delay in order to meet their obligations under the Treaty.
A system of effective guarantees has been in place since 1997. It is a combination of Full Scope Safeguards Agreements and of the Additional Protocol to this agreement. For the EU, these two instruments are the current verification standard.
When the discovery of the clandestine military nuclear programme in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War exposed the limits of actions by the IAEA in a country that has only a Full Scope Safeguards Agreement, the international community took the initiative to establish a new binding legal instrument to strengthen the system of guarantees. This initiative resulted in the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1997.
It is a fact that the implementation of the Additional Protocol in a given country is an imperative element for allowing the IAEA to provide credible assurance that that country is not engaged in undeclared nuclear activities.
Currently 106 States Parties have not implemented any additional protocol. The EU calls on all the States Parties that have not put into effect an additional protocol to do so without delay in order to greatly strengthen confidence in respect for non-proliferation commitments. The EU requests that this conference recognise the Full Scope Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols as the current verification standard for all States Parties.
The EU is determined to fight terrorism. This fight is both important and urgent, as we are tragically reminded by the terrorist attacks of the past few years. The EU strongly supports all measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their delivery systems. This is why we have supported and viewed favourably the inclusion of an anti-terrorism provision in each export control regime. In addition, the EU firmly supports the action of the IAEA to counter this danger. We thus welcome the efforts made in other areas, such as the G8, to prevent terrorists and those who support them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related equipment and technology. Effective measures must be taken to control the problem of misuse and of trafficking in materials that can be used to design, develop, manufacture or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems, as well as the participation of non-state actors in the proliferation of WMD. In this context, the EU recalls the important non-proliferation of WMD measures by which the member states of the United Nations are bound in accordance with resolution 1540 of the Security Council. The EU welcomes the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The EU hopes that this Convention will be signed and ratified as quickly as possible by all the states.
As regards security, it is not just the risk of regional conflict that is aggravated, but the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is also increased. In this context, the EU notes with great concern that certain non-nuclear States Parties to the Treaty do not always respect their non-proliferation obligations.
The European Union deplores that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced in January 2003 its intention to withdraw from the NPT. We continue to encourage it to again fully respect its international obligations regarding non-proliferation incumbent upon it under the Treaty and in accordance with its guarantees with the IAEA. All clandestine nuclear weapons programmes must be completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantled. The EU reaffirms that it is firmly resolved to contribute to finding a peaceful, negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear problem; it hopes that the dialogue undertaken in the framework of the six-party talks will be restarted without delay. North Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty is an unprecedented challenge. This event has provoked debate on the implementation of article X of the Treaty, on which the High-Level Panel of the United Nations and the Director General of the IAEA have made themselves heard. The EU considers that the review conference must seriously address the question of withdrawal.
The European Union is united in its determination to prevent Iran from gaining access to military nuclear capabilities and to see the proliferating implications of its nuclear programme resolved. It fully supports the negotiations underway between France, the United Kingdom and Germany, with the full participation of the Secretary General of the Council, the High Representative of the CFSP, and Iran, on the basis of the Paris Convention of 15 November 2004. The European Union notes that Iran signed the Additional Protocol, especially for resolving pending questions. The European Union welcomes Iran's commitment to suspend all activities related to the enrichment and reprocessing of uranium, under the control of the IAEA. The European Union calls on Iran to fully and in good faith respect all of its international commitments, as well as to furnish the international community with objective guarantees that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful use by stopping development and operation of its fissile materials production capacities. It is up to Iran to rebuild confidence. The European Union calls on Iran to strictly respect the Paris Convention of 15 November 2004 and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, in particular the suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities, as provided for in the Paris Convention.
On 19 December 2003, Libya announced its decision to eliminate all materials, equipment and programmes involved in the production of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. All the states welcome the fact that Libya has opened its nuclear weapons programme to IAEA inspections, that it has undertaken to cooperate with the Agency, that it has ratified the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), that it has signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA and that it has decided to implement it. The international community views favourably the dismantling of Libya's programme as a particularly positive precedent and as an example to be followed by others.
We note the conclusion of the Director General of the IAEA, which indicates that the uranium enrichment programmes of Iran and Libya have common elements and that their basis is very similar, and to a great extent, they were obtained from the same foreign sources, namely the network of AQ Khan. This is a cause of great concern. In addition, we unreservedly join in the call by the Director General that all member states of the IAEA fully cooperate to uncover the sources of and the means by which nuclear and non-nuclear technology and equipment are supplied.
Illegal trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technologies is a grave concern to the European Union as well as to the States Parties to the NPT. The European Union favours the implementation of rigorous and effective export controls at national and international levels, and it considers that these controls are a necessary complement to the non-proliferation obligations contracted under the NPT. It must be acknowledged, following the recent revelations, that efforts must be redoubled to tackle the illegal trade and supply networks and to resolve the problem posed by the participation of non-state actors in the proliferation of WMD. In this context, we welcome the efforts made to dismantle these networks in Pakistan, in Malaysia, in South Africa, in the United Arab Emirates and in other countries. These efforts must be continued.
Considering the aggravation of the risk of proliferation, the EU believes that, in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1540 of the UNSC, both export and import states must assume their responsibilities and take the necessary measures to adequately monitor and control exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technology. Export controls must guarantee that the transfers are to be used for peaceful purposes, as required by the NPT, and must also facilitate cooperation and development of nuclear technologies. The EU will seek to strengthen the effectiveness of export controls, to prevent all uncontrolled dissemination, especially through non-state actors, of the most sensitive technologies, and to define the consequences that will result from not complying with non-proliferation obligations. Nevertheless, we will most particularly ensure that the fundamental principles of the Treaty are maintained, including the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and cooperation in that area. The EU will act to safeguard the great majority of countries that respect these commitments from the consequences of the violation of these rules by a few. We will avoid any division of the international community. Also, the EU will continue to strengthen the effectiveness of export control policies and practices, within the EU and outside of it, in concert with all countries that share this objective.
Article IV of the NPT strongly defends the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while respecting articles I, II and III of the Treaty. These countries can use nuclear energy for the production of electricity and for nuclear applications in the areas of health, industry, agriculture and research.
The EU emphasises the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, for the safe management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and it calls on the States that have not done so already to accede to all the relevant Conventions as rapidly as possible and to fully meet their obligations resulting therefrom.
We are pleased with the adherence of Cuba to the Treaty in 2002 and East Timor in 2003. Cuba's adherence to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty has made it possible to complete the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. The EU Member States continue to place great importance on making the NPT universal and on the universal observance of the Treaty's provisions. In this respect, we regret that three countries, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, remain outside the Treaty. In accordance with the EU common position on universalisation and strengthening multilateral agreements in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, adopted in November 2003, we continue to call on them to join the NPT without reservation as states not in possession of nuclear weapons.
The EU continues to monitor developments in the situation in South-East Asia. We note that India and Pakistan have decreed a moratorium on nuclear testing and that they have agreed to participate in the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We call on these states to adopt and implement all measures necessary to honour these promises. We are also pleased with the fact that the planned global dialogue announced between India and Pakistan will also address confidence-building measures in nuclear matters. The EU calls on India and Pakistan to apply a moratorium on the production of fissile material used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and to sign and ratify the CTBT, which would prove to be a vitally important confidence-building measure.
The EU continues to be committed to the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. We are also calling on all the states in the region that have not yet done so to join the NPT, but to also join the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. The EU is asking the states of the region to make a commitment to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as outlined by United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, including an effective verification system. In seeking to achieve this objective, and after the recent revelations, it is essential that the states of the region comply strictly with the commitments they have made. We consider that the entire international community should place priority on having all the States of the region conclude general guarantees with the IAEA and additional protocols, which would be a decisive contribution to a general strengthening of security and confidence in the Middle East.
The EU is pleased that, since the end of the Cold War, the arms race between the former USSR and the United States has ended. There have been major reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems, so that the EU is expecting further systematic and gradual efforts toward nuclear disarmament.
The EU is also pleased that many production facilities for nuclear material to be used in nuclear weapons have been closed and dismantled. Four of the five states that possess nuclear weapons have moratoria in effect on the production of these fissile materials. The EU is asking China to join the other states with nuclear weapons to decree a moratorium on the production of fissile material to be used for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to refrain from expanding its nuclear arsenal.
In terms of nuclear disarmament, the EU recognises the importance of programmes to destroy and eliminate nuclear weapons and to eliminate fissile material that exceed defence needs in the context of the G8 Global Partnership.
The EU welcomes the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, which entered into force on 1 June 2003. According to this Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation will reduce the number of their strategic nuclear warheads deployed under operational conditions to a number between 1,700 and 2,200 by 31 December 2012. This is an important step in the context of international security and a contribution to the international community's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. In this context, the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability retain their full importance. The EU expects further reductions in the Russian and American arsenals.
The subject of non-strategic nuclear weapons appears in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the reduction in the number of these weapons is an integral part of control and nuclear disarmament measures. We await expectantly the honouring of the declarations made by the U.S. and Russian presidents in 1991-1992 regarding the unilateral reduction of their inventories of tactical nuclear weapons and the commitments made by the respective states at the 2000 Review Conference. We encourage all these states to open negotiations that aim to conclude an agreement that is effectively verifiable with regard to successfully reducing the number of these weapons as much as possible.
We stress the importance of international cooperation to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The EU and its Member States support the G8 global partnership without reservation and are contributing actively to this partnership which works effectively to promote disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. At the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, the G8 identified an exhaustive set of non-proliferation principles; these are criteria that should be adopted and implemented in order to establish genuine international cooperation in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The European Union is determined to pursue its cooperation programmes that strive for non-proliferation and disarmament. We consider that reducing the threat through cooperation is an effective instrument for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. At this time, we are seriously considering expanding the EU's programmes in this area.
The EU regrets the current deadlock in the Disarmament Conference and is convinced that, in view of the new threats to peace and security, this stalemate should end as quickly as possible. The EU intends to work actively to have consensus emerge on the work programme at the conference and, in this regard, is pleased that new ideas have been put forward over the past few years. We appreciate these efforts that aim to encourage consensus on a work programme. In the context of the NPT, the resumption of the conference's substantive work is particularly important with regard to the negotiations on a Treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
The EU's policy objective is to reach an international agreement on banning the production of fissile material for the manufacture of weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The EU attaches special importance to the negotiation of a non-discrimination treaty, universal in scope, that bans the production of such fissile material without precondition and that keeps in mind the report of the special coordinator, including the mandate, which would strengthen both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and, as a result, international security.
To date, 175 states have signed the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and 120 of them have ratified it. The EU notes that it places the utmost importance on having the CTBT enter into force as soon as possible. We ask all the states that have not yet done so, and in particular those listed in Appendix II of the Treaty, whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay and without condition. In this respect, we are pleased that Algeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo recently ratified the CTBT, which brings us closer to both its universalisation and its entry into force. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the EU strongly encourages all the States to observe a moratorium and to refrain from any measure that would be in conflict with the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. The EU, which is working vigorously to promote universal adherence to the CTBT, was actively involved in the work of the conference in Vienna in September 2003 to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We take advantage of this opportunity to praise the work done by the provisional secretariat of the CTBTO (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation) under the direction of Mr Wolfgang Hoffmann, and to welcome the appointment of Mr Tibor Toth as Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO.
The EU recognises the ongoing great value of the existing security guarantees that are legally binding and made in the context of the Protocols to the Treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the unilateral statements made by the states that possess nuclear weapons to the NPT Member States that do not possess nuclear weapons, on the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, outlined by Resolution 984/1995 of the Security Council and reaffirmed at the 2000 Review Conference. The EU's strategy for weapons of mass destruction indicates that security guarantees, positive and negative, can play an important role in the NPT regime. They can encourage countries to refrain from acquiring WMDs and can also have a deterrent effect. In the context of our strategy on WMDs, we are resolved to encourage the continuation of the review of the security guarantees.
To help achieve consensus at our Review Conference, the Council of the European Union has adopted a common position with regard to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The Council of the EU has identified a number of items that seem fundamental to us and that cover the NPT's three pillars: non proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. I will not read them aloud, but they are written out in full at the end of the written version of my address, which is being made available to you. I would ask you kindly to review them:
1. Make efforts to preserve the integrity of the NPT and to strengthen its implementation;
2. Recognise that the NPT is a unique and irreplaceable multilateral instrument for maintaining and strengthening international peace, security and stability, in that it sets forth the legal framework for preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, for further developing the verification system ensuring that nuclear energy is used exclusively for peaceful purposes by the states that do not possess nuclear weapons and that it is the essential basis for continuing nuclear disarmament in compliance with article VI of the NPT;
3. Work to promote the universalisation of the NPT;
4. Stress the absolute necessity of ensuring full compliance with all the NPT's provisions by all states party to the Treaty;
5. Call on all states that are not party to the NPT to make non-proliferation and disarmament commitments and to call on these states so that they become party to the NPT as states not in possession of nuclear weapons;
6. Recognise that since the conclusion of the 2000 Review Conference, serious events have occurred regarding nuclear proliferation;
7. Stress the necessity of strengthening the role of the United Nations Security Council as final arbiter so that it may take appropriate action for non-compliance with the obligations under the NPT in accordance with the statutes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the application of guarantees;
8. Point out the possible implications of a withdrawal from the NPT for international peace and security. Urge the adoption of measures to discourage withdrawals from the Treaty;
9. Request the suspension of nuclear cooperation with a state when the IAEA is unable to give sufficient assurances that this state's nuclear programme is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes and continue the suspension until the agency is able to do so;
10. Call on the states of the region to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, including other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, effectively verifiable, in accordance with the Middle East Resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference;
11. Since security in Europe is linked to security in the Mediterranean, give priority to the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in this region;
12. Recognise the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones for peace and security based on arrangements freely made among the states of the region in question;
13. Emphasise the necessity of doing everything to prevent the risk of nuclear terrorism linked to possible access by terrorists to nuclear weapons or nuclear material that could be used in the manufacture of devices for radiological dispersion and, in this context, underscore the necessity of observing the obligations arising from Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). Call for bolstering the security of high-activity radioactive sources. In this respect, support the work of the G8 and the IAEA;
14. In light of the heightened threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, recognise that the global initiative to reduce threats and the G8's global partnership initiative are to be approved;
15. Call for the universalisation of general guarantee agreements and additional protocols;
16. Recognise that general guarantee agreements and additional protocols have a deterrent effect on nuclear proliferation and are today's verification standard, and continue to work for improved detectability of possible violations of NPT obligations;
17. Work to have the IAEA's Council of Governors recognise that the conclusion of an agreement of general guarantees and an additional protocol is the verification standard today;
18. Emphasise the unique role that the IAEA plays in verifying the observance by states of their nuclear non-proliferation commitments and, upon request, help them strengthen the security of nuclear material and facilities and call on the states to support the agency;
19. Recognise the importance of effective and appropriate export controls in compliance with Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and in accordance with NPT article III, paragraph 2;
20. On the national level, implement effective controls for exports, transit, transhipment and re-export, as well as laws and regulations appropriate for this purpose;
21. Implement effective deterrent criminal sanctions to prevent illegal export, transit and brokerage, trafficking, and related financing in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);
22. Encourage the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Supplier Group to share their experiences in the area of export control so that all the states may draw inspiration from the Zangger Committee's arrangements and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) guidelines;
23. Point out the necessity of promptly strengthening the NSG guidelines in order to adapt them to the new challenges of non-proliferation;
24. Call on the states that are party to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material to work toward a rapid conclusion of the amended convention;
25. Recognise that the states that are party to the NPT have the right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty and in observance of articles I, II and III of the Treaty;
26. Emphasise the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, safe waste management and radiation protection, and call on the states that have not already done so to adhere to all the relevant conventions as soon as possible and to fully implement their obligations arising from those conventions;
27. Note that the states party to the NPT, in accordance with article IV, may use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity, industry, health and agriculture;
28. Encourage the formulation of guarantees for access to services related to nuclear fuel, or to this fuel itself, under appropriate conditions;
29. Make note of the report of the IAEA's group of experts on multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and promote the prompt start of its review in the IAEA;
30. While recognising that there has been a reduction in nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, stress the necessity of an overall reduction of nuclear arsenals in the continuation of systematic and gradual efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT and, in this context, salute the ratification in 2003 of the Moscow Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, while still emphasising the necessity of making further progress in the reduction of their arsenals;
31. Highlight the necessity of implementing the 1991-1992 statements of the presidents of Russia and the United States on the unilateral reductions of their inventories of non-strategic nuclear weapons and call on all the states that possess non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them, in order to reduce and eliminate them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes;
32. Recognise the application of the irreversibility principle to guide all measures in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control as a contribution to keeping and strengthening international peace, security and stability, in view of these conditions;
33. From a nuclear disarmament standpoint, recognise the importance of programmes to destroy and eliminate nuclear weapons and to eliminate fissile material as set forth in the G8 global partnership;
34. Pursue transparency efforts which serve as voluntary confidence-building measures that foster the achievement of new progress in the area of disarmament;
35. Since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) comprises an essential share of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and for its entry into force as soon as possible and without condition, call on the states, in particular those listed in appendix II, to sign and ratify the treaty without delay and without condition and, pending the entry into force, call on all the states to apply a moratorium and to refrain from any action that conflicts with the treaty's obligations and provisions. Emphasise the importance of the work done by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation and actively support the work of the Special Representative of the states that have ratified the Treaty, as the Representative has the task of promoting universal adherence to this Treaty;
36. Issue another appeal to the disarmament conference in order to immediately begin and conclude as quickly as possible a non-discriminating universally applicable treaty that bans the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without precondition, and keeping in mind the report of the special coordinator, including the mandate, pending the entry into force of treaty, call on all the states to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU applauds the action of the five states that possess nuclear weapons and that have decreed a moratorium in this regard;
37. Call on all the relevant states to take appropriate practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war;
38. Continue the review of the issue of security assurances for states that do not have nuclear weapons but are party to the NPT;
39. Call on the states with nuclear weapons to reaffirm the existing security assurances outlined by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 984 (1995) and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols on the nuclear-weapon-free-zones, prepared after the required consultations have been completed, recognising that these zones enjoy security assurances in the form of treaties;
40. Emphasise the necessity of general disarmament;
41. Highlight the importance of the universalisation and the implementation of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and conventions, measures and initiatives that contribute to the control of conventional weapons;
42. Call for the universalisation and effective application of The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation;
43. Work to solve regional problems of instability and insecurity as well as conflict situations that are often the source of many weapons programmes.
In conclusion, the EU is convinced that by giving a framework of security and stability to all the states, the NPT is making a decisive contribution to the cause of peace. Compliance by all the Parties with the obligations incumbent on them in the Treaty is the essential condition for preserving collective security over the coming decades.
Thank you, Mr. President.
* Croatia continues to participate in the Stabilisation and Association Process.